Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2010-02-12
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the economics literature, we model the risk-aversion of a seller by endowing the seller with a monotone concave utility function. We then seek robust mechanisms that are approximately optimal for all sellers, no matter what their levels of risk-aversion are. We have two main results for multi-unit auctions with unit-demand bidders whose valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution. First, we identify a posted-price mechanism called the Hedge mechanism, which gives a universal constant factor approximation; we also show for the unlimited supply case that this mechanism is in a sense the best possible. Second, we show that the VCG mechanism gives a universal constant factor approximation when the number of bidders is even only a small multiple of the number of items. Along the way we point out that Myerson's characterization of the optimal mechanisms fails to extend to utility-maximization for risk-averse sellers, and establish interesting properties of regular distributions and monotone hazard rate distributions.
Sundararajan Mukund
Yan Qiqi
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