Roberts' Theorem with Neutrality: A Social Welfare Ordering Approach

Details Roberts' Theorem with Neutrality: A Social Welfare Ordering Approach Roberts' Theorem with Neutrality: A Social Welfare Ordering Approach

2010-03-08

arxiv.org/abs/1003.1550v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a weighted welfare maximizer if the type space of every agent is an $m$-dimensional open interval, where $m$ is the number of alternatives. When the type space of every agent is unrestricted, Roberts' theorem with neutrality \cite{Roberts79} becomes a corollary to our result. Our proof technique uses a {\em social welfare ordering} approach, commonly used in aggregation literature in social choice theory. We also prove the general (affine maximizer) version of Roberts' theorem for unrestricted type spaces of agents using this approach.

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