Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Details Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access

2011-05-28

arxiv.org/abs/1105.5743v1

Mathematics

Optimization and Control

Scientific paper

We investigate revenue maximization problems in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We consider the frequency division and spread spectrum methods of dynamic spectrum sharing. In the frequency division method, a primary spectrum user allocates portions of spectrum to different secondary users. In the spread spectrum method, the primary user allocates transmission powers to each secondary user. In both cases, we assume that a secondary user's utility function is linear in the rate it can achieve by using the available spectrum/power. Assuming strategic users, we present incentive compatible, individually rational and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the two scenarios.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-289480