Replicator dynamics with mutations for games with a continuous strategy space

Details Replicator dynamics with mutations for games with a continuous strategy space Replicator dynamics with mutations for games with a continuous strategy space

2005-05-12

arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0505032v2

Nonlinear Sciences

Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems

26 pages, 10 figures

Scientific paper

A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove and Coordination games, and to the Ultimatum Game. In the latter case, we find that adding even a small mutation term to the replicator equation leads to a solution where the average offer is significantly larger than zero.

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