Computer Science – Information Theory
Scientific paper
2009-10-12
Computer Science
Information Theory
This paper is presented in Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing 2009
Scientific paper
In this paper, spectrum access in cognitive radio networks is modeled as a repeated auction game subject to monitoring and entry costs. For secondary users, sensing costs are incurred as the result of primary users' activity. Furthermore, each secondary user pays the cost of transmissions upon successful bidding for a channel. Knowledge regarding other secondary users' activity is limited due to the distributed nature of the network. The resulting formulation is thus a dynamic game with incomplete information. In this paper, an efficient bidding learning algorithm is proposed based on the outcome of past transactions. As demonstrated through extensive simulations, the proposed distributed scheme outperforms a myopic one-stage algorithm, and can achieve a good balance between efficiency and fairness.
Han Zhangang
Poor Vincent H.
Zheng Rong
No associations
LandOfFree
Repeated Auctions with Learning for Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with Repeated Auctions with Learning for Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Repeated Auctions with Learning for Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-639739