Mathematics – Optimization and Control
Scientific paper
2011-02-14
Mathematics
Optimization and Control
Scientific paper
We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions $u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$ has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the characterization of efficient Nash equilibria mainly follows from the analysis carried out in part I. When the payoff functions are individually quasi-Leontief functions the matter is somewhat more complicated. We assume that all the strategy spaces are compact topological semilattices, and under appropriate continuity conditions on the payoff functions, we show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibria using the Eilenberg-Montgomery Fixed Point Theorem for acyclic valued upper semicontinuous maps defined on an absolute retract and some non trivial properties of topological semilattices. The map in question is defined on the set of Nash equilibria and its fixed points are exactly the efficient Nash equilibria.
Briec Walter
Horvath Charles
Liang QiBin
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