Computer Science – Cryptography and Security
Scientific paper
2009-10-29
Computer Science
Cryptography and Security
31 pages, 2 figures; short version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of MFPS 2010
Scientific paper
As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols have been proposed and implemented to provide such strengthened forms of authentication, but there are very few proofs that such protocols satisfy the required security properties. The logical formalisms, devised for reasoning about security protocols on standard computer networks, turn out to be difficult to adapt for reasoning about hybrid protocols, used in pervasive and heterogenous networks.
We refine the Dolev-Yao-style algebraic method for protocol analysis by a probabilistic model of guessing, needed to analyze protocols that mix weak cryptography with physical properties of nonstandard communication channels. Applying this model, we provide a precise security proof for a proximity authentication protocol, due to Hancke and Kuhn, that uses a subtle form of probabilistic reasoning to achieve its goals.
Meadows Catherine
Pavlovic Dusko
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