Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

Details Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

2010-12-23

arxiv.org/abs/1012.5173v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

11 pages; presented at LOFT 2010 (9th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory) University of Toulo

Scientific paper

In [Van Benthem 2007] the concept of a public announcement is used to study
the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We
offer a simple generalisation of this approach to cover arbitrary strategic
games and many optimality notions. We distinguish between announcements of
optimality and announcements of rationality.

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