Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box Model

Details Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box Model Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box Model

2011-11-10

arxiv.org/abs/1111.2520v1

Computer Science

Cryptography and Security

Extended abstract appeared in Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society (WPES 2007)

Scientific paper

We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing. The analysis is presented in a black-box model of anonymous communication in the Universally Composable framework that abstracts the essential properties of onion routing in the presence of an active adversary that controls a portion of the network and knows all a priori distributions on user choices of destination. Our results quantify how much the adversary can gain in identifying users by exploiting knowledge of their probabilistic behavior. In particular, we show that, in the limit as the network gets large, a user u's anonymity is worst either when the other users always choose the destination u is least likely to visit or when the other users always choose the destination u chooses. This worst-case anonymity with an adversary that controls a fraction b of the routers is shown to be comparable to the best-case anonymity against an adversary that controls a fraction \surdb.

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