Prizes, Groups and Pivotal Voting in a Poisson Voting Game

Details Prizes, Groups and Pivotal Voting in a Poisson Voting Game Prizes, Groups and Pivotal Voting in a Poisson Voting Game

2011-06-15

arxiv.org/abs/1106.3102v1

Mathematics

Probability

32 pages, 5 figures

Scientific paper

We model elections between two parties in a Poisson random population of voters (Myerson 1998, 2000). In addition to offering different policy benefits, parties offer contingent prizes to those identifiable groups of voters that offer the highest level of political support. In large populations, voters are only likely to influence the electoral outcome when the vote share between two parties is perfectly equal and even then their influence on the outcome is small. In contrast voters retain significant influence over the distribution of prizes even in lopsided elections. Equilibrium behavior is driven by voters competing to win preferential treatment for their group and not by policy concerns. The results address variance in turnout in elections, political rewards and the persistence of dominant parties even when they are popularly perceived as inferior.

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