Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design

Details Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design

2011-11-14

arxiv.org/abs/1111.3350v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types leaked by the outcome of the mechanism. We present a new model for privacy-aware mechanism design, where we only assume an upper bound on the agents' loss due to leakage, as opposed to previous work where a full characterization of the loss was required. In this model, under a mild assumption on the distribution of how agents value their privacy, we show a generic construction of privacy-aware mechanisms and demonstrate its applicability to electronic polling and pricing of a digital good.

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