Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: indirect scoring procedures

Details Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: indirect scoring procedures Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: indirect scoring procedures

2006-02-08

arxiv.org/abs/math/0602171v3

Journal of the Franklin Institute, 336 (1999), No.2, 205-226. Erratum: 336 (1999) No.4, 747-748 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S

Mathematics

Optimization and Control

26 pages, 5 figures One typo fixed

Scientific paper

10.1016/S0016-0032(98)00017-9

We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of {\em win-loss combining scoring procedures} is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Two main results are established. According to the first one, every win-loss combining scoring procedure breaks self-consistent monotonicity. The second result provides a sufficient condition of satisfying self-consistent monotonicity.

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