Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium

Details Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium

2007-03-27

arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0703057v1

J. Theor. Biol. 237: 363 - 368 (2005)

Biology

Quantitative Biology

Populations and Evolution

12 pages

Scientific paper

We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.

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