Biology – Quantitative Biology – Populations and Evolution
Scientific paper
2008-03-07
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 251, 181-189 (2008)
Biology
Quantitative Biology
Populations and Evolution
4 figures
Scientific paper
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players that have different adaptation rates. We show analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player.
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