On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates

Details On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates

2011-03-26

arxiv.org/abs/1103.5150v1

Biology

Quantitative Biology

Populations and Evolution

Scientific paper

Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied
. Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of
coexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1,r3 -> infinity cooperation
is the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit cooperators.

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