Nash bargaining with a nondeterministic threat

Details Nash bargaining with a nondeterministic threat Nash bargaining with a nondeterministic threat

2007-12-29

arxiv.org/abs/0801.0092v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Added solution algorithm

Scientific paper

We consider bargaining problems which involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points in the real plane representing all realizable bargains. We also assume that there is no definite threat or disagreement point which will provide the default bargain if the players cannot agree on some point in the bargaining set. However, there is a nondeterministic threat: if the players fail to agree on a bargain, one of them will be chosen at random with equal probability, and that chosen player will select any realizable bargain as the solution, subject to a reasonable restriction.

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