Market Mechanisms with Non-Price-Taking Agents

Details Market Mechanisms with Non-Price-Taking Agents Market Mechanisms with Non-Price-Taking Agents

2011-08-12

arxiv.org/abs/1108.2728v3

Mathematics

Optimization and Control

"IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (TAC)", 27 pages (one column)

Scientific paper

The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced, individually rational, and it converges to an optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem. Such a mechanism is very useful in a network with general topology and no auctioneer where the competitive agents/users want different type of services.

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