Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2009-03-12
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
20 pages, 5 figures. To appear in the Proceedings of The First Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Application
Scientific paper
Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the effects of two types of strategic behavior involving more than one agent, sybils and collusion, in the context of scrip systems where agents provide each other with service in exchange for scrip. Sybils make an agent more likely to be chosen to provide service, which generally makes it harder for agents without sybils to earn money and decreases social welfare. Surprisingly, in certain circumstances it is possible for sybils to make all agents better off. While collusion is generally bad, in the context of scrip systems it actually tends to make all agents better off, not merely those who collude. These results also provide insight into the effects of allowing agents to advertise and loan money. While many extensions of Nash equilibrium have been proposed that address collusion and other issues relevant to distributed and peer-to-peer systems, our results show that none of them adequately address the issues raised by sybils and collusion in scrip systems.
Friedman Eric J.
Halpern Joseph Y.
Kash Ian A.
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