Computer Science – Information Theory
Scientific paper
2010-11-24
Computer Science
Information Theory
10 pages, 7 figures. Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Scientific paper
This paper investigates reliable and covert transmission strategies in a MIMO wiretap channel with a transmitter, receiver and an adversarial wiretapper, each equipped with multiple antennas. In a departure from existing work, the wiretapper possesses the dual capability to act either as a passive eavesdropper or as an active jammer, under a halfduplex constraint. The transmitter therefore faces a choice between allocating all of its power for data, or broadcasting artificial noise along with the information signal in order to selectively jam the eavesdropper (assuming its instantaneous channel state is unknown). To examine the resulting tradeoffs for both agents, we model the network as a two-person zero-sum game with the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate as the payoff function. We first quantify and rank the various possible MIMO secrecy rate outcomes of the actions available to each player, and derive asymptotic expressions for the same. We then examine conditions for the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for the strategic form of the game, where the players move simultaneously. We also examine the extensive form of the game where players move sequentially, for both perfect and imperfect information scenarios, respectively. Finally, numerical simulations are presented to corroborate the analytical results.
Mukherjee Amitav
Swindlehurst Lee A.
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