Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets

Details Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets

2011-11-18

arxiv.org/abs/1111.4350v3

Computer Science

Networking and Internet Architecture

9 pages

Scientific paper

In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a state agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through auctions. We show that these hierarchical markets do not result in a socially efficient spectrum allocation which is aimed by the agency, due to lack of coordination among the entities in different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives, we propose an incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy and the actions of the POs with the objective of the agency, and thus leads to system performance improvement in terms of social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method for hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the proposed incentive mechanism is a novel auction scheme which enables POs to allocate their spectrum by balancing their derived revenue and the welfare of the SOs.

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