Imitation in Large Games

Details Imitation in Large Games Imitation in Large Games

2010-06-08

arxiv.org/abs/1006.2992v1

EPTCS 25, 2010, pp. 162-172

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

10.4204/EPTCS.25.16

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation types: that of players who imitate choice of other (optimizing) types. Game theorists typically study the evolution of such games in dynamical systems with imitation rules. In the setting of games of infinite duration on finite graphs with preference orderings on outcomes for player types, we explore the possibility of imitation as a viable strategy. In our setup, the optimising players play bounded memory strategies and the imitators play according to specifications given by automata. We present algorithmic results on the eventual survival of types.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Imitation in Large Games does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Imitation in Large Games, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Imitation in Large Games will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-30935