Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2008-07-16
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1) It takes into account the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2) For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, the hybrid auction can result in significantly higher revenue. 3) An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneer's estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneer's prior without incurring any extra cost. 4) The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies. As Internet commerce matures, we need more sophisticated pricing models to exploit all the information held by each of the participants. We believe that hybrid auctions could be an important step in this direction.
Goel Ashish
Munagala Kamesh
No associations
LandOfFree
Hybrid Keyword Search Auctions does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with Hybrid Keyword Search Auctions, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Hybrid Keyword Search Auctions will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-660255