Computer Science – Cryptography and Security
Scientific paper
2010-03-28
Computer Science
Cryptography and Security
16 pages, Appeared in proceedings of Security with Rewriting Techniques (SecRet09), Affiliated to CSF Symposium 2009, Port Jef
Scientific paper
Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system. In this paper, we prove that type-flaw attacks can be prevented with the same technique even under the ACUN algebraic properties of XOR which is commonly used in "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0. Our proof method is general and can be easily extended to other monoidal operators that possess properties such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also discuss how tagging could be used to prevent type-flaw attacks under other properties such as associativity of pairing, commutative encryption, prefix property and homomorphic encryption.
Lafourcade Pascal
Malladi Sreekanth
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