From Convex Optimization to Randomized Mechanisms: Toward Optimal Combinatorial Auctions

Details From Convex Optimization to Randomized Mechanisms: Toward Optimal Combinatorial Auctions From Convex Optimization to Randomized Mechanisms: Toward Optimal Combinatorial Auctions

2011-02-28

arxiv.org/abs/1103.0040v3

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Extended abstract appears in Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2011

Scientific paper

We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1/e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.

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