Fairness in Combinatorial Auctions

Details Fairness in Combinatorial Auctions Fairness in Combinatorial Auctions

2010-05-26

arxiv.org/abs/1005.4774v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

22 pages; extended version of arXiv:0809.2168

Scientific paper

The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the combinatorial auctioning system (CAS). We use this framework to define our concept of fairness in terms of what we call as "basic fairness" and "extended fairness". The assumptions of quasilinear preferences and dominant strategies are taken into consideration while explaining fairness. We give an algorithm to ensure fairness in a CAS using a Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). We use an algorithm of Sandholm to achieve optimality. Basic and extended fairness are then analyzed according to the dominant strategy solution concept.

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