Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players

Details Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players

2007-04-16

arxiv.org/abs/0704.2014v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

45 pages, 3 figures, a preliminary version was presented at AAMAS06

Scientific paper

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they may not be aware of moves that they and other agents can make. We show how such games can be represented; the key idea is to describe the game from the point of view of every agent at every node of the game tree. We provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and show that every game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we extend these results to games with awareness of unawareness, where a player i may be aware that a player j can make moves that i is not aware of, and to subjective games, where payers may have no common knowledge regarding the actual game and their beliefs are incompatible with a common prior.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-44603