Statistics – Methodology
Scientific paper
2012-03-12
Statistics
Methodology
8 pages, 3 figures; Keywords: experimental economics, evolutionary rotation, replicator dynamics, zero-sum game, switching inc
Scientific paper
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the rotation ---- both of its direction and its strength. In data from a switching payoff matrix experiment of extended 2x2 games (Binmore, Swierzbinski and Proulx, 2001 [1]), we find the changing of the social evolutionary rotation can be distinguished quantitatively. The evolutionary rotation can be captured by evolutionary dynamics. With eigenvalue from the Jacobian of a constrained replicator dynamics model, an interpretation for observed rotation strength is given. In addition, equality-of-populations rank test shows that relative response coefficient of a group could persist cross the switching parameter games. The data has successively been used to support Von Neumann's minimax theory. Using the old data, with observed evolutionary rotation, this report provides a new insight into evolutionary game theory and experimental social dynamics.
Wang Zhijian
Xu Bin
No associations
LandOfFree
Evolutionary Rotation in Switching Incentive Zero-Sum Games does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with Evolutionary Rotation in Switching Incentive Zero-Sum Games, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Evolutionary Rotation in Switching Incentive Zero-Sum Games will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-489225