Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players

Details Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players

2004-09-23

arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409026v1

Biology

Quantitative Biology

Populations and Evolution

15 pages, to appear in J. Theor. Biology

Scientific paper

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.

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