Equilibria in Quitting Games - Basics

Details Equilibria in Quitting Games - Basics Equilibria in Quitting Games - Basics

2011-01-12

arxiv.org/abs/1101.2337v1

Mathematics

Probability

Scientific paper

Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff, which depends on the set of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero. For analysis of quitting games the so called one-step games are used. Important properties of the expected payoff and of equilibria in one-step games are stated. Furthermore some relations between equilibria in one-step games and equilibria in quitting games are considered. This analysis of the structure of quitting games and the related one-step games should provide a basis for an implementation of an algorithm that detect equilibria in Quitting Games.

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