Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games

Details Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games

2007-11-15

arxiv.org/abs/0711.2334v1

Mathematics

Optimization and Control

Scientific paper

A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand coalition in all convex games and the tau-value encourages the grand coalitions in convex games up to three (but not more than three) players. Solution functions that encourage the grand coalition in convex games always produce allocations in the core, but the converse is not necessarily true.

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