Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in a Scrip System for P2P Networks

Details Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in a Scrip System for P2P Networks Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in a Scrip System for P2P Networks

2007-05-28

arxiv.org/abs/0705.4094v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

A model of providing service in a P2P network is analyzed. It is shown that by adding a scrip system, a mechanism that admits a reasonable Nash equilibrium that reduces free riding can be obtained. The effect of varying the total amount of money (scrip) in the system on efficiency (i.e., social welfare) is analyzed, and it is shown that by maintaining the appropriate ratio between the total amount of money and the number of agents, efficiency is maximized. The work has implications for many online systems, not only P2P networks but also a wide variety of online forums for which scrip systems are popular, but formal analyses have been lacking.

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