E-commerce between a large firm and a SME supplier: a screening model

Details E-commerce between a large firm and a SME supplier: a screening model E-commerce between a large firm and a SME supplier: a screening model

2009-12-19

arxiv.org/abs/0912.3920v1

Journal of Computing, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 158-161, December 2009

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

This paper derives a model of screening contracts in the presence of positive network effects when building an electronic commerce network (e-commerce) between a large firm and a small and medium sized enterprise (SME) supplier based on Compte (2008). Compte (2008) main insight is that when several potential candidates compete for the task, the principal will in general improve the performance of his firm by inducing the member candidates to assess their competence before signing the contract (through an appropriate choice of contracts). The large firm (principal) must choose between different SME suppliers (agents) to build a business to business e-commerce network. In the presence of positive network externalities, we show that social surplus increases.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

E-commerce between a large firm and a SME supplier: a screening model does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with E-commerce between a large firm and a SME supplier: a screening model, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and E-commerce between a large firm and a SME supplier: a screening model will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-382120