Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

Details Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

2012-04-02

arxiv.org/abs/1204.0323v1

Mathematics

Probability

Scientific paper

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

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