Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2009-07-06
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
This version of the manuscript is published in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (IEEE JSAC), VOL. 26, NO. 7, S
Scientific paper
Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call {\em BIC-B} (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The {\em BIC-B} protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol.
Narahari Yadati
Narayanam Ramasuri
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