Darwinian Evolution of Cooperation via Punishment in the "Public Goods" Game

Details Darwinian Evolution of Cooperation via Punishment in the "Public Goods" Game Darwinian Evolution of Cooperation via Punishment in the "Public Goods" Game

2010-06-15

arxiv.org/abs/1006.2903v1

Proc. 12th Intern. Conf, on Artificial Life, H. Fellerman et al, eds. (MIT Press, 2010) pp. 445-450

Biology

Quantitative Biology

Populations and Evolution

7 pages, 6 figures, requires alifex11.sty. To appear in Proc. of 12th International Conference on Artificial Life (Odense, DK)

Scientific paper

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem for evolutionary biology because cooperation is undermined by selfish cheaters (or "free riders") that profit from cooperators but do not invest any resources themselves. In a purely "selfish" view of evolution, those cheaters should be favored. Evolutionary game theory has been able to show that under certain conditions, cooperation nonetheless evolves stably. One of these scenarios utilizes the power of punishment to suppress free riders, but only if players interact in a structured population where cooperators are likely to be surrounded by other cooperators. Here we show that cooperation via punishment can evolve even in well-mixed populations that play the "public goods" game, if the synergy effect of cooperation is high enough. As the synergy is increased, populations transition from defection to cooperation in a manner reminiscent of a phase transition. If punishment is turned off, the critical synergy is significantly higher, illustrating that (as shown before) punishment aids in establishing cooperation. We also show that the critical point depends on the mutation rate so that higher mutation rates discourage cooperation, as has been observed before in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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