Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models, Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design

Details Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models, Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models, Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design

2011-03-14

arxiv.org/abs/1103.2795v1

Mathematics

Optimization and Control

Scientific paper

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.

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