CP-nets and Nash equilibria

Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

Rate now

  [ 0.00 ] – not rated yet Voters 0   Comments 0

Details

6 pages. in: roc. of the Third International Conference on Computational Intelligence, Robotics and Autonomous Systems (CIRAS

Scientific paper

We relate here two formalisms that are used for different purposes in reasoning about multi-agent systems. One of them are strategic games that are used to capture the idea that agents interact with each other while pursuing their own interest. The other are CP-nets that were introduced to express qualitative and conditional preferences of the users and which aim at facilitating the process of preference elicitation. To relate these two formalisms we introduce a natural, qualitative, extension of the notion of a strategic game. We show then that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly the Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic game in the above sense. This allows us to use the techniques of game theory to search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-versa, to use techniques developed for CP-nets to search for Nash equilibria of the considered games.

No associations

LandOfFree

Say what you really think

Search LandOfFree.com for scientists and scientific papers. Rate them and share your experience with other people.

Rating

CP-nets and Nash equilibria does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with CP-nets and Nash equilibria, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and CP-nets and Nash equilibria will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

     

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-503186

  Search
All data on this website is collected from public sources. Our data reflects the most accurate information available at the time of publication.