Correlated Equilibria in Continuous Games: Characterization and Computation

Details Correlated Equilibria in Continuous Games: Characterization and Computation Correlated Equilibria in Continuous Games: Characterization and Computation

2008-12-22

arxiv.org/abs/0812.4279v2

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 71, No. 2, March 2011, Pages 436-455

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Games and Economic Behavior, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 16 April 2010

Scientific paper

10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.004

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with polynomial utility functions.

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