Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma

Details Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma

2011-03-10

arxiv.org/abs/1103.1980v3

Mathematics

Logic

Scientific paper

Using Sperner's lemma for modified partition of a simplex we will
constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic
game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions. We follow the
Bishop style constructive mathematics.

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