Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets

Details Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets

2010-01-11

arxiv.org/abs/1001.1686v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $i$ has a private value $v_i$, a budget $b_i$, and is interested in all the items in $S_i$. The value to agent $i$ of a set of items $R$ is $|R \cap S_i| \cdot v_i$. Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for ads in response to an advertiser-dependent set of adwords, and advertisers have budgets. It is known that even of all items are identical and all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel auction that runs in polynomial time, is incentive compatible, and ensures Pareto-optimality for such auctions when the valuations are private and the budgets are public knowledge. This extends the result of Dobzinski et al. (FOCS 2008) for auctions of multiple {\sl identical} items and public budgets to single-valued {\sl combinatorial} auctions with public budgets.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-719229