Clone Structures in Voters' Preferences

Details Clone Structures in Voters' Preferences Clone Structures in Voters' Preferences

2011-10-18

arxiv.org/abs/1110.3939v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

35 pages, 3 figures

Scientific paper

In elections, a set of candidates ranked consecutively (though possibly in different order) by all voters is called a clone set, and its members are called clones. A clone structure is a family of all clone sets of a given election. In this paper we study properties of clone structures. In particular, we give an axiomatic characterization of clone structures, show their hierarchical structure, and analyze clone structures in single-peaked and single-crossing elections. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a minimal collection of clones that need to be collapsed for an election to become single-peaked, and we show that this problem is NP-hard for single-crossing elections.

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