Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs

Details Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs

2006-10-16

arxiv.org/abs/cs/0610098v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

To appear, IJCAI 2007

Scientific paper

We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution concepts are implementations of two knowledge-based programs, one appropriate for games represented in normal form, the other for games represented in extensive form. These knowledge-based programs can be viewed as embodying rationality. The representation works even if (a) information sets do not capture an agent's knowledge, (b) uncertainty is not represented by probability, or (c) the underlying game is not common knowledge.

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