Building Better Incentives for Robustness in BitTorrent

Details Building Better Incentives for Robustness in BitTorrent Building Better Incentives for Robustness in BitTorrent

2011-08-12

arxiv.org/abs/1108.2716v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

14 pages, 11 figures, technical report

Scientific paper

BitTorrent is a widely-deployed, peer-to-peer file transfer protocol engineered with a "tit for tat" mechanism that encourages cooperation. Unfortunately, there is little incentive for nodes to altruistically provide service to their peers after they finish downloading a file, and what altruism there is can be exploited by aggressive clients like Bit- Tyrant. This altruism, called seeding, is always beneficial and sometimes essential to BitTorrent's real-world performance. We propose a new long-term incentives mechanism in BitTorrent to encourage peers to seed and we evaluate its effectiveness via simulation. We show that when nodes running our algorithm reward one another for good behavior in previous swarms, they experience as much as a 50% improvement in download times over unrewarded nodes. Even when aggressive clients, such as BitTyrant, participate in the swarm, our rewarded nodes still outperform them, although by smaller margins.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Building Better Incentives for Robustness in BitTorrent does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Building Better Incentives for Robustness in BitTorrent, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Building Better Incentives for Robustness in BitTorrent will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-635648