Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2002-01-19
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
We introduce a class of mechanisms, called {\em bidding clubs}, that allow agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. Bidding clubs invite a set of agents to join, and each invited agent freely chooses whether to accept the invitation or whether to participate independently in the auction. Agents who join a bidding club first conduct a ``pre-auction'' within the club; depending on the outcome of the pre-auction some subset of the members of the club bid in the primary auction in a prescribed way. We model this setting as a Bayesian game, including agents' choices of whether or not to accept a bidding club's invitation. After describing this general setting, we examine the specific case of bidding clubs for first-price auctions. We show the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where agents choose to participate in bidding clubs when invited and truthfully declare their valuations to the coordinator. Furthermore, we show that the existence of bidding clubs benefits all agents (including both agent inside and outside of a bidding club) in several different senses.
Leyton-Brown Kevin
Shoham Yoav
Tennenholtz Moshe
No associations
LandOfFree
Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-489819