Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes

Details Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes

2012-03-27

arxiv.org/abs/1203.5945v3

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

This version was posted without enough prior discussion with my collaborator. My collaborator would prefer it not to be posted

Scientific paper

We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders' utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j's utility.

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