Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks

Details Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks

2010-04-12

arxiv.org/abs/1004.2079v2

Proc. ACM-SIAM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (2011) 1518-1537

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

47 pages, SODA 2011, invited to Journal of Economic Theory

Scientific paper

We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on estimated best alternative matches, in the spirit of pairwise Nash bargaining. We establish that when a balanced outcome (a generalization of the pairwise Nash bargaining solution to networks) exists, our dynamics converges rapidly to such an outcome. We extend our results to the cases of (i) general agent 'capacity constraints', i.e., an agent may be allowed to participate in multiple matches, and (ii) 'unequal bargaining powers' (where we also find a surprising change in rate of convergence).

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-280336