Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Without Unanimity

Details Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Without Unanimity Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Without Unanimity

2009-01-29

arxiv.org/abs/0901.4727v5

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Most of the new results in the Arxiv sumbission now appear in a follow up paper on quantitative Arrow's theorem

Scientific paper

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Transitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity is a dictatorship. Wilson derived properties of constitutions satisfying Transitivity and IIA for unrestricted domains where ties are allowed. In this paper we consider the case where only strict preferences are allowed. In this case we derive a new short proof of Arrow theorem and further obtain a new and complete characterization of all functions satisfying Transitivity and IIA.

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