Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Details Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

2006-06-30

arxiv.org/abs/cs/0606127v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

latex source, 22 pages, 1 figure

Scientific paper

We make three different types of contributions to cost-sharing: First, we identify several new classes of combinatorial cost functions that admit incentive-compatible mechanisms achieving both a constant-factor approximation of budget-balance and a polylogarithmic approximation of the social cost formulation of efficiency. Second, we prove a new, optimal lower bound on the approximate efficiency of every budget-balanced Moulin mechanism for Steiner tree or SSRoB cost functions. This lower bound exposes a latent approximation hierarchy among different cost-sharing problems. Third, we show that weakening the definition of incentive-compatibility to strategyproofness can permit exponentially more efficient approximately budget-balanced mechanisms, in particular for set cover cost-sharing problems.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-117223