An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders

Details An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders

2009-02-03

arxiv.org/abs/0902.0524v3

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

8 Pages, Managing Complexity in Distributed World, MCDES 2008: IISc Centenary Conference of Division of Electrical Sciences Ad

Scientific paper

The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. The auction minimizes the cost of procurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility.

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