An Algebraic Approach for Computing Equilibria of a Subclass of Finite Normal Form Games

Details An Algebraic Approach for Computing Equilibria of a Subclass of Finite Normal Form Games An Algebraic Approach for Computing Equilibria of a Subclass of Finite Normal Form Games

2010-05-30

arxiv.org/abs/1005.5507v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

9 pages

Scientific paper

A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic finite normal form games. We define "rational payoff irrational equilibria games" to be the games with all rational payoffs and all irrational equilibria. We present a purely algebraic method for computing all Nash equilibria of these games that uses knowledge of Galois groups. Some results, showing properties of the class of games, and an example to show working of the method concludes the paper.

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